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1.
《Physics letters. A》2020,384(35):126904
Exploring the evolution of cooperation has been one of the most challenging topics and attracted increasing attention in various realms. Hereby, we institute an analytic model where the relationship between the common benefits and contributions is the typical saturation nonlinearity. We investigate the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation with and without consensual incentives respectively. The population always evolves to full defection when the incentives are absent. Cooperation, however, can be promoted by consensual incentives when the degree of cooperators' preferences for incentives is great. There exists an intermediate amount of resources at which the positive effect of consensual incentives on cooperation is minimized. Furthermore, there is a U-shape relationship between the degree of cooperators' preference for an incentive and the evolution of cooperation. A greater basin of full cooperation can be induced when the cooperators' preference for reward is more pronounced than that for punishment. 相似文献
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In this study, we investigate two important questions related to dynamic pricing in distribution channels: (i) Are coordinated pricing decisions efficient in a context where prices have carry-over effects on demand? (ii) Should firms practice a skimming or a penetration strategy if they choose to coordinate or to decentralize their activities? To answer these questions, we consider a differential game that takes place in a bilateral monopoly where the past retail prices paid by consumers contribute to the building of a reference price. The latter is used by consumers as a benchmark to evaluate the value of the product, and by firms to decide whether to adopt a skimming or a penetration strategy. 相似文献
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In the game of cops and robber, the cops try to capture a robber moving on the vertices of the graph. The minimum number of cops required to win on a given graph G is called the cop number of G. The biggest open conjecture in this area is the one of Meyniel, which asserts that for some absolute constant C, the cop number of every connected graph G is at most . In a separate paper, we showed that Meyniel's conjecture holds asymptotically almost surely for the binomial random graph. The result was obtained by showing that the conjecture holds for a general class of graphs with some specific expansion‐type properties. In this paper, this deterministic result is used to show that the conjecture holds asymptotically almost surely for random d‐regular graphs when d = d(n) ≥ 3. 相似文献
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We study the committee decision making process using game theory. Shenoy [15] introduced two solution concepts: the one-core and the bargaining set, and showed that the one-core of a simple committee game is nonempty if there are at most four players. We extend this result by proving that whether the committee is simple or not, as far as there are less than five players, the one-core is nonempty. This result also holds for the bargaining set. 相似文献
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以邻苯二胺为表面活性剂,通过水热釜法一步制备凹形树突状PtCu双金属纳米催化剂(PtCu NCDs)。PtCu NCDs在电催化甲醇氧化(MOR)的应用中表现出非常高的活性和很强的抗有毒中间体作用。PtCu NCDs对于甲醇氧化的质量活性为(0.53 A·mg-1 Pt)是商业Pt/C(0.26 A·mg-1 Pt)的2.04倍。从比活性的CV曲线图对比发现PtCu NCDs(1.07 mA·cm-2)是商业Pt/C(0.55 mA·cm-2)的1.95倍。而且,PtCu NCDs(2.76)比商业Pt/C催化剂(1.02)表现出更高的If/Ib比值。这些优异的电催化活性可能归功于PtCu NCDs特殊的凹形树突状形貌。 相似文献
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Why would natural selection favor the prevalence of cooperation within the groups of selfish individuals? A fruitful framework to address this question is evolutionary game theory, the essence of which is captured in the so-called social dilemmas. Such dilemmas have sparked the development of a variety of mathematical approaches to assess the conditions under which cooperation evolves. Furthermore, borrowing from statistical physics and network science, the research of the evolutionary game dynamics has been enriched with phenomena such as pattern formation, equilibrium selection, and self-organization. Numerous advances in understanding the evolution of cooperative behavior over the last few decades have recently been distilled into five reciprocity mechanisms: direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, kin selection, group selection, and network reciprocity. However, when social viscosity is introduced into a population via any of the reciprocity mechanisms, the existing scaling parameters for the dilemma strength do not yield a unique answer as to how the evolutionary dynamics should unfold. Motivated by this problem, we review the developments that led to the present state of affairs, highlight the accompanying pitfalls, and propose new universal scaling parameters for the dilemma strength. We prove universality by showing that the conditions for an ESS and the expressions for the internal equilibriums in an infinite, well-mixed population subjected to any of the five reciprocity mechanisms depend only on the new scaling parameters. A similar result is shown to hold for the fixation probability of the different strategies in a finite, well-mixed population. Furthermore, by means of numerical simulations, the same scaling parameters are shown to be effective even if the evolution of cooperation is considered on the spatial networks (with the exception of highly heterogeneous setups). We close the discussion by suggesting promising directions for future research including (i) how to handle the dilemma strength in the context of co-evolution and (ii) where to seek opportunities for applying the game theoretical approach with meaningful impact. 相似文献